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COMMENTARY
A CALL FOR THE ADOPTION OF
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN SOUTH
CAROLINA
Under the present accident reparations system in South
Carolina, the plaintiff's contributory negligence, no matter how
slight, poses a complete bar to recovery.' Fortunately, the law is
an evolving concept. Criticism of its established institutions
keeps it healthy and attuned to society's needs. The desire for
improvement must be never-ending.' Public dissatisfaction with
the manner in which accident victims are treated in the courts is
evident in South Carolina.3 Society itself joins these victims in
demanding that they be compensated for their injuries according
to an equitable and just system. The inadequacies of this con-
tributory negligence doctrine have become manifest. The acci-
dent victim's ability to recover damages for injuries wrongfully
inflicted upon him is severely limited. The burden of the loss is
imposed upon the one least able to absorb it-the victim him-
1. E.g., Gladden v. Southern Ry. Co., 142 S.C. 492, 141 S.E. 90 (1928).
Contributory negligence is a want of ordinary care upon the part of a per-
son injured by the actionable negligence of another, combining and concurring
with that negligence, and contributing to the injury as a proximate cause
thereof, without which the injury would not have occurred.
It is a well established rule that "contributory negligence to any extent will
always defeat a recovery."
Id. at 552-23, 141 S.E. at 99-100 (citations omitted).
The first South Carolina case recognizing the contributory negligence bar is Freer v.
Cameron, 38 S.C.L. (4 Rich.) 228 (1851).
We recognize the doctrine, that if a party has been guilty of fault or negligence,
not wanton and intended for mischief, and another, by his own want of ordi-
nary caution, shall suffer damage thereby, the law will not help to a recovery,
for it will meet him with its own maxim, "damnun absque injuria."
Id. at 231.
2. "Changes in human affairs and imperfections in human institutions make neces-
sary constant efforts to maintain and improve our legal system. This should function in a
manner that commands public respect and fosters the use of legal remedies to achieve
redress of grievances." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMI'rY, ETHICAL CONSmERA-
TION 8-1.
3. SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY LEGISLATrvE AUDIT COUNCIL, SuNsEr REviEw OF
THE INSURANCE CoMMIssIoN/DEPARTmENT OF INSURANCE 89-94 (1979).
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self. If his family and friends cannot help the victim, then the
charity of the state ultimately is called upon to bear the loss.,
The doctrine of comparative negligence rectifies these inequities
by placing the losses on the party who wrongfully inflicted the
injuries. Parts I and II of this Note consider the replacement of
the contributory neligence defense with a system of comparative
negligence. Part III compares the various forms of comparative
negligence and advocates adoption of the pure form.
I. WHY Now?-THE PARADE OF STATES
When Professor Turk wrote his landmark article on compar-
ative negligence in 1950, 5 the doctrine had just begun its march
through the states. At that time, only five states had enacted
some form of comparative negligence: Georgia,6 Mississippi, 7 Ne-
braska, ' South Dakota,9 and Wisconsin.'" Arkansas followed in
1957," as did Maine in 1965.12 In 1969 comparative negligence
had a heyday; statutes were enacted in Hawaii,13 Massachu-
setts,'" Minnesota,' 5 and New Hampshire.'" Vermont followed in
1970,'1 with Colorado,' 8 Oregon,' 9 Idaho,20 and Rhode Island riglht
behind in 1971.21 The march accelerated. In 1973 alone, compar-
ative negligence statutes were enacted in Connecticut, 22 Ne-
4. Cf. A. CusTY, SoUTm CAROLINA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND SELECTED FED-
ERAL REMEDIES 208-10 (1979) (workmen's compensation area).
5. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189, 304
(1950).
6. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1968) (pure). The major versions of comparative negli-
gence systems are the "slight-gross," "not-greater-than," "not-as-great-as," and "pure"
versions. For an explanation of these versions, see notes 142-59 and accompanying text
infra.
7. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972) (pure).
8. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1975) (slight-gross).
9. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979) (slight-gross).
10. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-80) (not greater than).
11. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1764-65 (1979) (of less degree).
12. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (Cum. Supp. 1979-80) (not equally at fault).
13. HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976) (not greater than).
14. MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (not greater than).
15. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Cum. Supp. 1980) (not greater than).
16. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1977) (not greater than).
17. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973) (not greater than).
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1978) (not as great as).
19. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1977) (not greater than).
20. IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (1979) (not as great as).
21. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (pure).
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (not greater than).
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vada,23 New Jersey,24  North Dakota,25 Oklahoma, 2  Texas, 2
Utah,28 Washington, 2 and Wyoming. 3 In the same year the Su-
preme Court of Florida grew impatient and judically adopted a
pure comparative negligence system without waiting for any leg-
islative help. 3' Kansas enacted the doctrine in 1974,32 Montana33
and New York34 in 1975. The supreme courts of California and
Alaska,3 16 following Florida's lead, judicially adopted the doctrine
in 1975. In 1977, the Supreme Court of Michigan applauded the
pure form of comparative negligence, but in a split decision de-
cided to wait for the legislature to act. 37 The spread of the doc-
trine through the states has been like a wildfire in the recent
past, and "the march of comparative negligence [has] turned
into a stampede . . .,31
South Carolina has not been left out of this procession. Re-
sponding to public pressure generally, and to the plight of the
automobile accident victim particularly, the South Carolina
General Assembly in 1974 enacted a statute that provided that
contributory negligence shall not be a bar to recovery in actions
23. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1977) (not greater than).
24. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-80) (not greater than).
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 -(1975) (not as great as).
26. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13, 14 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-80) (not greater
than).
27. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980) (not greater
than).
28. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977) (not as great as).
29. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1978) (pure).
30. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-109 (1977) (not as great as).
31. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973) (pure).
32. KAN. Civ. PRO. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (Vernon Supp. 1978) (less than).
33. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 58-607.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (not greater than).
34. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 1411 (McKinney 1976) (pure).
35. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 828-29, 532 P.2d 1226, 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 875 (1975) (pure).
36. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975) (pure).
It appears to us that continued adherence to the contributory negligence
rule, absent legislative change, represents judicial inertia rather than a rea-
soned consideration of the intrinsic value of the rule. We are persuaded that
the contributory negligence rule yields unfair results which can no longer be
justified. We hold, therefore, that the doctrine of contributory negligence shall
no longer be applicable in Alaska, and in its stead the principle of comparative
negligence must be applied.
Id. at 1049.
37. Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977) (court split 3-3).
38. V. ScHwARTz, CoMPARATmIV NEGLIGENCE 3 (1974).
1980]
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arising out of motor vehicle accidents.39 This comparative negli-
gence statute of limited application was short-lived. Four years
later, in Marley v. Kirby,0 the South Carolina Supreme Court
declared that this statute violated the equal protection clauses of
the South Carolina and United States Constitutions because it
applied only to a limited class of defendants. 4' The court, how-
ever, did "recognize the validity of comparative negligence stat-
utes of general application. Such statutes violate neither the due
process nor equal protection clause and are enacted pursuant to
the police power of a state."42 In an apparent reaction to the su-
preme court's invitation in Marley, a bill providing for a compar-
ative negligence statute of general application has been intro-
duced into South Carolina's legislature. 3
Contributory negligence has fallen into disfavor as a legal
doctrine outside as well as inside the United States. For exam-
ple, by 1953, the United States was considered the last
stronghold of contributory negligence. 4 Today, at least thirty-
one states have either legislatively or judically adopted some
form of comparative negligence; 5 contributory negligence is now
a rapidly declining minority rule. It stands discredited even in
the land of its birth." Comparative negligence is no longer a nov-
elty, but a workable system.
Federal law features comparative negligence principles in
several areas, notably the Federal Employer's Liability Act,47 the
Jones Act,4" the Death on the High Seas Act, 9 and the Federal
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-300 (1976) (not greater than).
40. 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978).
41. Id. at 124, 245 S.E.2d at 606.
42. Id.
43. H.R. 2709, 1979 S.C. General Assembly.
44. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. Rv. 465, 466 (1953). The
stronghold was slipping even then. That same year, however, the United States Supreme
Court observed that the contributory negligence rule was "a discredited doctrine which
automatically destroys all claims of injured persons who have contributed to their inju-
ries in any degree, however slight." Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409
(1953).
45. See notes 6-36 and accompanying text supra.
46. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c.28, § 221
(switching to comparative negligence). See Eldredge, Contributory Negligence: An Out-
moded Defense That Should Be Abolished, 43 A.B.A.J. 52, 54 n.6 (1957).
47. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976) (pure).
48. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976) (pure). See Forestel v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 269,
274 (D. La. 1966), aff'd sub nom., Forestel v. Pennsylvania Navigation Co., 404 F.2d 1386
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 941 (1969).
49. 46 U.S.C. § 866 (1976) (pure).
[Vol. 31
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Tort Claims Act.-" Positions favoring adoption of comparative
negligence as a substitute for the contributory negligence doc-
trine have been taken by the American Bar Association,5 ' the
American Trial Lawyers Association,5 2 and the Defense Research
Institute.13 Comparative negligence is advocated and contribu-
tory negligence denounced 5 by such respected legal scholars as
Prosser, 5 Wade, 56 Keeton, 57 Leflar, 5 and James. 9
In light of this trend, it is highly likely that the doctrine of
comparative negligence will eventually find its way into South
Carolina law. This article is intended to provide some guidance
to the legislator on why comparative negligence is desirable and
what form of comparative negligence is preferable. Additionally,
it is intended to familiarize the practitioner with this doctrine,
so that he or she will be prepared to deal with the change in the
law whenever it occurs.
II. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE VS. COMPARATiVE NEGLIGENCE
Comparative negligence, although somewhat of a misno-
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976) (incorporating state law).
51. Marryott, The Automobile Accident Reparations System and the American Bar
Association, 6 FoRuM 79, 82-83 (1971).
52. A.T.L.A. MONOGRAPH, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, foreword (V. Schwartz ed.
1970).
53. Responsible Reform: A Program to Improve the Liability Reparation System, 8
D.R.I. PAMPHLEr 23 (1969).
54. See Eldredge, supra note 46, at 53 (indicating that an informal poll of the Com-
mittee on Torts of the American Law Institute unanimously opposed the contributory
negligence bar in favor of apportionment of damages).
55. Prosser, supra note 44, at 469.
Criticism of the denial of all recovery is not slow in coming, and it has been
with us for more than a century. The attack upon contributory negligence has
been founded upon the obvious injustice of a rule which visits the entire loss
caused by the fault of two parties on one of them alone, and that one the in-
jured plaintiff, least able to bear it, and quite possibly much less at fault than
the defendant who goes scot free. No one has ever succeeded in justifying that
as a policy, and no one ever will.
Id.
56. Symposium-Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negli-
gence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAD. L. REV. 889, 938-48 (1968)
(John W. Wade).
57. Id. at 906-17 (Robert E. Keeton).
58. Id. at 918-29 (Robert A. Leflar).
59. James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953) (Fleming James, Jr.).
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mer,10 is a fault concept that apportions each party's liability for
damages in proportion to the extent each party's negligence con-
tributed to causing the injury or damage.6 It is founded on the
belief that damages in a tort action should be apportioned be-
tween the parties on the basis of fault, that is, every person
should be responsible to another to the extent that his negligence
has caused another injury. It operates to relieve the litigants of
the harsh results that flow from application of the contributory
negligence rule. Under the latter scheme, when the plaintiff has
been contributorily negligent, no matter how slightly, he is abso-
lutely barred from recovering against even an overwhelmingly
negligent defendant." Under comparative negligence, however,
when the plaintiff also has been negligent he is not automatically
and preemptorily barred from all recovery, but neither does he
profit from his own negligence, for his damages are reduced pro-
portionately. By apportioning the costs of an accident according
to fault, comparative negligence holds each party responsible for
his acts, yet relieves the parties from an all-or-nothing situa-
tion.6  Since "the essence of comparative negligence systems is to
alleviate the harshness of the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence,"6 the following sections will examine this latter doctrine
in greater detail.
A. Origin of the Contributory Negligence Rule
An historical analysis of the origin of the contributory negli-
60. Prosser, supra note 44, at 465 n.2.
"Comparative negligence" properly refers only to a comparison of the fault of
the plaintiff with that of the defendant. . . .In the interest of clarity the term
should be avoided, and the statutes here in question should be called "damage
apportionment" or "comparative damages" acts. . . . "Comparative negli-
gence" is, however, in much too general use to permit much hope of its
elimination.
Id.
61. C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 1.10 (1978).
62. E.g., Sandifer v. Sale, 196 F. Supp. 721, 723 (D.S.C. 1961); Gladden v. Southern
Ry., 142 S.C. 492, 522-23, 141 S.E. 90, 99-100 (1928).
63. See generally Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A
Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 135 (1958); Mole, A Study of Comparative Neg-
ligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 604 (1932); Philbrick, Loss Apportionment in Negligence
Cases, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 572, 766 (1951).
64. C. HEFT, supra note 61, § 1.20. See also Ghiardi, Comparative Negligence-The
Wisconsin Rule and Procedure, 18 DEF. L.J. 537 (1969); Heft, Spreading the Bur-
den, The Better Way to Accomplish Contribution Is by Comparative Negligence, 22
FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 37 (Summer 1972).
[Vol. 31
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gence rule raises suspicions regarding the solidity of its founda-
tion. In the first contributory negligence case, the plaintiff, Mr.
Butterfield, rode his horse at a good speed on his way home from
a "public house." Mr. Forrester had previously placed a pole
across the road. As fate would have it, Mr. Butterfield ran his
horse into the pole and was injured. Out of this scenario arose
the memorialized case of Butterfield v. Forrester.5 The King's
Bench refused to permit Mr. Butterfield to recover his damages.
With the following words, Lord Ellenborough, perhaps unwit-
tingly, created the doctrine of contributory negligence:
A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has
been made by the fault of another, and avail himself of it, if he
do not himself use common and ordinary caution to be in
the right .... One person being in fault will not dispense with
another's using ordinary care for himself. Two things must con-
cur to support this action, an obstruction in the road by the
fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it
on the part of the plaintiff.6
The court felt that the obligation to exercise due care to respect
the safety of others was no less than the corresponding obligation
to utilize care in protecting one's own self. Butterfield became
the authority for the contributory negligence rule-when a plain-
tiff's own negligence, whether great or small, contributes to the
happening of an accident he cannot hold liable the defendant
who negligently injured him.
7
In the Butterfield opinion, Lord Ellenborough premised his
remarks by stating that a "party is not to cast himself upon an
obstruction ..... ,1 Moreover, Judge Bayley, who also heard
the case, regarded Mr. Butterfield as having been the sole cause
of the misfortune when he wrote that "the accident appeared to
happen entirely from [Mr. Butterfield's] own fault." 9 Thus, in-
stead of standing for the proposition that plaintiff's claim was
barred because his negligence contributed to his injuries, Butter-
field also can fairly be read as holding that plaintiff's claim must
fail because his own negligence was the sole cause of his injuries
65. 11 East. 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
66. Id. at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
67. See, e.g., Williams v. Kinney, 267 S.C. 163, 226 S.E.2d 555 (1976).
68. 11 East. at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
1980]
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(perhaps because he had the last opportunity to avoid the acci-
dent).7 This interpretation is strengthened by Davies v. Mann, 
7
decided only thirty years later, in which the harshness of the
contributory negligence rule was mollified by the creation of the
"last clear chance" doctrine. 2 It would appear that Butterfield v.
Forrester and the contributory negligence defense could be clas-
sified with Winterbottom v. Wright7 3 and the privity of contract
requirement74 as another example of judicial misconstruction
that should be corrected.
One explanation for this misconstruction of plain language
becomes apparent when viewed in light of the times. The Indus-
trial Revolution was in full swing, and laissez faire was the prev-
alent philosophy. The increased utilization of machinery pro-
duced a laborer's nightmare of injuries, but this was considered
the price that had to be paid for progress and a higher standard
of living." Under these circumstances, at a time when insurance
was virtually unknown, it was considered the better practice not
to penalize the new industries, for "otherwise men would be un-
willing to embark on new and untried enterprises for fear of the
crushing liability that might ensue. '7 6 It is not surprising that
the language in Butterfield was seized upon by jurists anxious to
find some means to protect the infant industries and railroads,
the operations of which produced an unending plethora of acci-
dents, from the crippling nuisance of claims by injured
employees.
Social values and conditions in South Carolina and else-
where have changed considerably since the early days of the
nineteenth century. Furthermore, the South Carolina Workmen's
Compensation system 77 has removed most of the inequities sur-
70. "One wonders whether the case might have been decided differently if the pro-
portion of fault of the plaintiff had not been so great." Maloney, supra note 63, at 141.
71. 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842).
72. "In its original form, [the doctrine stated] ... that where the defendant had the
last, and therefore the better, opportunity to avoid the accident, his negligence super-
seded that of the plaintiff, and contributory negligence was no defense." Prosser, supra
note 44, at 472.
73. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
74. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (abol-
ishing privity of contract requirement).
75. See generally F. Dir, THE INDUSTIHAL REVOLUTION 98-102 (1927); P. LANE, THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLtrrIoN 138-46, 242-56 (1978).
76. Maloney, supra note 63, at 137.
77. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-10 to -19-40 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
[Vol. 31
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rounding work-related accidents. The employer has abrogated
his common-law defenses, including the contributory negligence
bar, and the injured employee now receives a certain compensa-
tion for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. 8
In contrast to the employment context, the contributory negli-
gence defense works the greatest injustice today in cases arising
out of motor vehicle accidents. In 1978 South Carolina traffic ac-
cidents numbered 97,883, resulting in 898 deaths and 23,223 in-
juries, with an economic loss totaling $310 million." These acci-
dents are a profuse source of litigation. The contributory
negligence doctrine originally was developed to protect the in-
dustrial tortfeasor for the common good-there is no parallel
need to protect the negligent driver.
The purpose of this excursion back to the nineteenth cen-
tury has not been merely to pay homage to history, but rather to
show that the rationale supporting the contributory negligence
rule has dissolved. The time has come for the contributory negli-
gence bar, like the laissez faire philosophy of the Industrial
Revolution to be relegated to the past.
A precedent, in law, in order to be binding, should appeal to
logic and genuine sense of justice. What lends dignity to the
law founded on precedent is that, if analyzed, the particularly
cited case wields authority by the sheer force of its self-inte-
grated honesty, integrity, and rationale. A precedent cannot,
and should not, control, if its strength depends alone on the
fact that it is old, but may crumble at the slightest probing
touch of instinctive reasoning and natural justice."0
Stare decisis should not be invoked to refresh a stale decision.
Indeed, it is an attorney's ethical duty to see that this is not
done.8 "It would seem . . . that the continued vitality of con-
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-510 (1976).
79. S.C. DEPARTMENT OF IGHWAYS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, 1978 SouTH CARo-
LINA TRAFFIC AccmmNrs 4 (1978).
80. Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 183, 142 A.2d 263, 274 (1958) (Musmanno, J.,
dissenting)'. The South Carolina Supreme Court has expressed a similar view: "The doc-
trine is not intended 'to effect a "petrifying rigidity, but to assure the justice that flows
from the certainty and stability."' Fundamentally, stare decisis is not a rule of law; it
is a matter of judicial policy. It does not render immutable judicial formulations of
common law rules." Brbwn v. Anderson County Hosp. Ass'n, 268 S.C. 479, 486-87, 234
S.E.2d 873, 876 (1977) (citations omitted).
81. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsSmrrY, ETICAL CONSIDEMATION 8-2. The law-
yer "should encourage the simplification of laws and the repeal or amendment of laws
19801
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tributory negligence is due mainly to a combination of [undue
emphasis on] stare decisis and legislative inertia.
8 2
B. Have the Exceptions Swallowed the Rule?
Contributory negligence is riddled with exceptions.-' Every
state has modified the contributory negligence defense in some
manner." The most important *common-law modification is
known as the "last clear chance" doctrine, which arose soon after
Butterfield in Davies v. Mann.5 In its original form, the doctrine
removed the contributory negligence defense in cases in which
the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. 6
If the defendant had the opportunity to prevent the accident,
then he could not rely on the contributory negligence defense to
prevent the plaintiff from recovering. The rationale underlying
the last clear chance doctrine appears to have nothing to do with
legal logic. Although some courts have attempted to explain it in
terms of "greater negligence" 7 or "proximate cause," this is
generally recognized to make little sense, 9 and it has been sug-
gested that "[tihe real explanation would appear to be nothing
more than a dislike for the defense of contributory negligence,
and rebellion against its application in a group of cases where its
hardship is most apparent."9
A further complication arises concerning just what is meant
by a "clear" chance. In some jurisdictions the defendant must
have actually discovered the plaintiff's peril,"1 while in others the
that are outmoded." Id.
82. Haugh, Comparative Negligence: A Reform Long Overdue, 49 OR. L. IRv. 38, 42
(1969).
83. Id. at 39.
84. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 5.
85. 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842).
86. Id.
87. Under this theory it is believed that the negligence of defendant must necessarily
be greater than that of plaintiff because the defendant's negligence occurs later in time.
See, e.g., Moreno v. Los Angeles Transfer Co., 44 Cal. App. 551, 555-56, 186 P. 800, 802
(1920); Dildine v. Flynn, 116 Kan. 563, 566-67, 227 P. 340, 342 (1924); Rawitzer v. St.
Paul City Ry. Co., 93 Minn. 84, 86-87, 100 N.W. 664, 666 (1904); Wilson v. Southern
Traction Co., 111 Tex. 361, 364-66, 234 S.W. 663, 663-64 (1921).
88. E.g., Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 547, 152 Eng. Rep. 588, 588 (1842).
89. See Maloney, supra note 63, at 145-46.
90. Prosser, supra note 44, at 472.
91. E.g., Hanson v. N.H. Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. 110 N.H. 377, 379-80, 268 A.2d 841,
842.43 (1970); Hamlin v. Roundy, 96 N.H. 123, 125, 71 A.2d 419, 420 (1950); Chadwick v.
City of New York, 301 N.Y. 176, 180-81, 93 N.E.2d 625, 627 (1950); Storr v. New York
10
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doctrine has been expanded, covering situations in which the de-
fendant by the exercise of reasonable care should have seen the
plaintiff's predicament.9 2 Other jurisdictions, however, have ex-
panded the doctrine to include instances in which the defendant,
because of his prior negligence, did not even have the ability to
avoid the accident. 3 Opinion is also divided whether the plaintiff
need be in helpless peril, 4 or merely negligently inattentive. 5 So
many variations on the last clear chance exception are found
that it has been observed that each state has its own unique ver-
sion.9 Missouri, for example, adheres to an esoteric "humanita-
rian" variation of the exception under which defendant may not
avail himself of the contributory negligence defense if he was
"oblivious" to plaintiff's "imminent peril."97 It has been noted
that the more a court dislikes the contributory negligence rule,
the broader its interpretation of the last clear chance exception.""
Since contributory negligence was never a defense to inten-
tional torts,99 it follows that the defense is generally unavailable
Cent. R.R. Co., 261 N.Y. 348, 350-51, 185 N.E. 407, 407-08 (1933); Cleveland Ry. Co. v.
Masterson, 126 Ohio St. 42, 47-54, 183 N.E. 873, 874-77 (1932).
92. E.g., Independent Lumber Co. v. Leatherwood, 102 Colo. 460, 463-67, 79 P.2d
1052, 1054-55 (1938); Letcher v. Derricott, 191 Kan. 596, 600, 383 P.2d 533, 536-37 (1963);
Leinback v. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 138 Kan. 50, 65-66, 23 P.2d 449, 455-57 (1933);
Pickett v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 117 N.C. 616, 636, 23 S.E. 264, 267 (1895); Teakle v.
San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co., 32 Utah 276, 291, 90 P. 402, 408-09 (1907);
Nicol v. Oregon-Washington R. & Navigation Co., 71 Wash. 409, 413-14, 128 P. 628, 630-
31 (1912).
93. E.g., Little Rock Traction & Elec. Co. v. Morrison, 69 Ark. 289, 293, 62 S.W.
1045, 1046 (1901); Dent v. Bellows Falls & S. R. St. Ry. Co., 95 Vt. 523, 529-30, 116 A. 83,
86 (1922).
94. E.g., Gray v. Woods, 84 Ariz. 87, 93, 324 P.2d 220, 223-24 (1958); Poindexter v.
Seaboard Air Lines, 56 So.2d 905, 910 (Fla. App. 1951).
95. E.g., Darling v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 197 Cal. 702, 707-08, 242 P. 703, 706 (1925);
Groves v. Webster City, 222 Iowa 849, 954-55, 270 N.W. 329, 332-33 (1936).
96. Prosser, supra note 44, at 473.
97. Becker, The Humanitarian Doctrine, 3 Mo. L. REv. 392, 393-94 (1938). See, e.g.,
Stevens v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 501 S.W.2d 494, 498-99 (Mo. App. 1973); McCall v.
Thompson, 348 Mo. 795, 803-04, 155 S.W.2d 161, 166-67 (1941). See generally Gaines,
The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri, 20 ST. Louis L. REV. 113 (1935); Maloney, supra
note 63, at 47 ("Just when this 'humanitarian' variation of the last clear chance doctrine
is applicable, only the judges on the Missouri court know . . ").
98. See generally James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J.
704 (1938).
99. See, e.g., Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Jones, 146 Ala. 277, 41 So. 146
(1906).
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when the defendant's conduct approaches intentional conduct.'Co
Thus, the defense is not available to a defendant who has acted
willfully, wantonly, or recklessly. 0 1 It has been suggested that
this exception arose originally as a result of the courts' struggle
not to absolve defendants whose conduct was extremely blame-
worthy when sued by badly maimed plaintiffs whose negligence
was slight.' However, "the exception has applied to relatively
few cases, and has had only limited importance.' 
13
Another exception to the contributory negligence defense
arises when the plaintiff's suit is founded on defendant's viola-
tion of a statute enacted to protect the public. When defendant
has violated a statute that was enacted to protect the class of
persons, to which plaintiff belongs, from the harm that occurred,
the plaintiffs contributory negligence will be no defense. 04
The exceptions briefly discussed above lend substance to the
following points. First, these exceptions do not operate to cure
the ills of the contributory negligence doctrine. These judicially
created exceptions, like the defense itself, operate to place the
entire loss from the accident on only one of the parties, even
though both are to some extent negligent.0 5 If an exception is
applicable, the plaintiff, despite his own negligence, recovers all
his damages from the defendant.' If the contributory negligence
rule applies, the defendant receives a windfall; if an exception is
applicable, then the plaintiff is unjustly enriched. Second, when-
100. Prosser, supra note 44, at 470; James, supra note 59, at 709-12.
101. E.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Seamon, 349 Mich. 387, 406-08, 84 N.W.2d 840, 846-47
(1957); Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co., 207 Or. 34, 42-43, 293 P.2d 717, 720-21 (1956). See
generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 22.6 (1956); W. PRossER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 65, at 426 (4th ed. 1971).
102. Haugh, supra note 82, at 40.
103. Prosser, supra note 44, at 470.
104. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 283 (1965); V. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 38, at 5; Prosser, Contributory Negligence as Defense to Violation of a Statute, 32
MIN. L. REV. 105 (1948).
105. Haugh, supra note 82, at 40.
106. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 5. Prosser recognized that
[i]t is . ..no more reasonable to charge the defendant with the plaintiff's
share of the consequences of his fault than to charge the plaintiff with the de-
fendant's; and it is no better policy to relieve the negligent plaintiff of all re-
sponsibility for his injury than it is to relieve the negligent defendant. The
whole floundering, haphazard, makeshift device [last clear chance] operates in
favor of some plaintiffs by inflicting obvious injustice upon some defendants
Prosser, supra note 44, at 474.
[Vol. 31
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ever a general rule is riddled with exceptions, the possibility of
confusion and inconsistent results heightens. The above excep-
tions, particularly the last clear chance rule, "present one of the
worst tangles known to law."'' 7 Overall, the contributory negli-
gence defense and its exceptions paint "really a most amazing
picture, which could be the work of no one but lawyers"'""
C. Modern Rationalizations
Several rationalizations have been advanced to justify reten-
tion of the contributory negligence defense. Foremost is the be-
lief that contributory negligence provides a necessary check on
plaintiff-oriented juries that would otherwise return excessive
verdicts.' This belief, however, is not supported by the findings
of the University of Chicago Jury Project, which indicated that
in automobile accident cases there is usually very little differ-
ence in amount between a judge's award and a jury's verdict in
the same case."10 "The old bugaboo of the runaway jury simply
was not borne out by the facts.""' Additionally, remittitur pow-
ers enable judges to reduce excessive verdicts to a reasonable
amount should it appear necessary."'
A related rationalization is the theory that since juries tend
to disregard contributory negligence instructions and to apply
their own comparative negligence standard instead, there is no
need to change the law."3 That this type of compromise goes on
in the jury room despite the judge's instructions is not only a
widely-held belief,"' but is supported by studies.15 The flaw in
107. Prosser, supra note 44, at 473.
108. Id. at 474.
109. E.g., Powell, Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the American
Jury, 43 A.B.A.J. 1005 (1957).
110. Kalven, Report on the Jury Project, CONFERENCE ON Aims AND M'rsoDs OF LE-
GAL RESEARCH 155, 173-74 (1955); A Report on the Jury Project of the University of Chi-
cago Law School, 24 INs. CouNsEL J. 368, 379-80 (1957).
111. Maloney, supra note 63, at 144.
112. E.g., Sellers v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 252 S.C. 271, 273, 166 S.E.2d 1, 1-2
(1969); Strickland v. Prince, 247 S.C. 497, 498-99, 148 S.E.2d 161, 162 (1966); Collins v.
Johnson, 245 S.C. 215, 220-21, 139 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1965).
113. See, e.g., Haugh, supra note 82, at 41. "We but blind our eyes to obvious reality
to the extent that we ignore the fact that in many cases juries apply it [apportionment]
in spite of us." Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430, 281 N.W. 261, 263
(1938).
114. See, e.g., Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150, 154 (1955). See gener-
ally Harkavy, Comparative Negligence: The Reflections of a Skeptic, 43 A.B.A.J. 1115,
1980] 769
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this reasoning is that it looks with approval upon jury miscon-
duct. "Moreover, there is something basically wrong with a rule
of law that is so contrary to the settled convictions of the lay
community that laymen will almost always refuse to enforce it,
even when solemnly told to do so by a judge whose instructions
they have sworn to follow.""'  Putting jurors in a position in
which they feel compelled to disregard the court's instructions,
and therefore the law, in order to achieve a result they consider
just, can only lead to disrespect and contempt for the courts.
"Approval of the covert violation of the present rule [contribu-
tory negligence], in the interests of justice, suggests that perhaps
the rule should be changed to conform to the practice."" 7 It
would be better if this apportionment by the jury were brought
out into the open where it would be subject to control by the
courts.,,s
Another concern of those favoring retention of the contribu-
tory negligence defense is the case load of the courts. Some ob-
servers fear that without this defense plaintiffs who would other-
wise have no hope of recovery due to their relative fault would
press their claims forward, thereby increasing court congestion."'
This reasoning overlooks the other side of the coin. Often the
greatest obstacle to establishing a defendant's liability in negli-
gence litigation is the contributory negligence defense. Many
times a defendant who is obviously in the wrong will hold out in
the hope that this defense will absolve him of all liability. The
abolition of the contributory negligence defense would therefore
act to encourage settlement, and every judge and attorney is
1116 (1957); Powell, supra note 111, at 1006.
115. E.g., Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal, Injury Damage Award, 19
OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 167-68 (1958).
116. Maloney, supra note 63, at 151. The quote continues:
Service as jurors is the only formal point of contact with the judicial system for
many, if not most of the citizens concerned. What sort of opinion of that sys-
tem is engendered by the instructions they receive in negligence cases? As one
prominent Pennsylvania attorney has put it, "it breeds contempt for law in
general and it breeds contempt for judges and lawyers."
Id. See also Eldredge, Contributory Negligence: An Outmoded Defense That Should Be
Abolished, 43 A.B.A.J. 52, 53 (1957).
117. Averbach, Comparative Negligence Legislation: A Cure for our Congested
Courts, 19 ALB. L. REV. 4, 11 (1955).
118. See Eldredge, supra note 116, at 54; Gair, The Contributory Negligence Rule:
An Offense to Justice, 35 N.Y.S.B.J. 392, 395 (1963); 1 VLL. L. REV. 115, 121 (1956).
119. See, e.g., Haugh, supra note 82, at 42.
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aware of the key role settlements play in reducing the docket.',0
Comparative negligence can facilitate the relief of current court
congestion.' 2'
Courts have recognized that principles of intervening cause
require the contributory negligence defense. According to this
reasoning, the plaintiff's negligence is considered to be "a super-
seding and intervening cause which acts as a cleavage between
the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury."'22 This be-
lief, that plaintiff's contributory negligence comes down like an
ax, cleaving all connection between defendant's negligence and
the resulting injuries to plaintiff, strains the principles of super-
seding and intervening cause beyond their justifiable scope.
"[T]o say the victim's negligence is the sole cause of the injury is
to attribute a meaning to legal cause that it would not have in
the case of, for example, joint tortfeasors injuring a third
person.",2-
Another rationalization that has been advanced to support
contributory negligence is that a plaintiff, by being negligent,
gives implied consent to all the consequences of his negligent
act, including his own injury.' 2 The validity of a theory based on
the idea that anyone would consent tb another doing him harm
is dubious, at best. Moreover, this theory ignores the injustice of
120. Legislation, Tort-Comparative Negligence Statute, 18 VAND. L. REV. 327, 329-
30 (1964).
121. "[C]omparative negligence encourages pre-trial settlements and jury waivers
and will tend to eliminate the need for trial specialists and docket delays." Maki v.
Frelk, 85 Ill. App.2d 439, 449, 229 N.E.2d 284, 290 (1967) (summarizing arguments only).
One writer has explained this as follows:
I do not think [comparative negligence] results in more litigation for the sim-
ple reason that while a plaintiff can bank on making some recovery in Wiscon-
sin, a traditionally comparative negligence jurisdiction, when he could not in
another state, he knows he is not going to get as much. Therefore, you have a
more realistic man to deal with.
Pfankuch, Comparative Negligence v. Contributory Negligence, 1968 INS. L.J. 725, 731.
One study, however, concludes that the number of cases tried under either system is
roughly the same. Rosenberger, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and Af-
ter" Survey, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 457, 475 (1964) ("[Florecasts of putative effects upon clogged
dockets and delayed trials are not constructive arguments for either side. Legislatures
facing the issue should confine themselves to the substantive pros or cons of the contend-
ing principles . . . ." Id.).
122. Haugh, supra note 82, at 39. See, e.g., Thomas v. Quatermaine, 18 Q.B. Div'l
Ct. 685 (1897).
123. C. HEer, supra note 61, at § 1.10.
124. F. HARPER & F. JAMs, supra note 102, § 22.2, at 1199-1201; see Haugh, supra
note 82, at 39.
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placing the burden of the entire loss of an accident caused by
two parties on one party, the plaintiff, while the negligent defen-
dant bears no responsibility.'1
It has been postulated that the contributory negligence de-
fense, by barring recovery, promotes safety on the highways,
since a potential plaintiff will be more careful if he knows he
cannot benefit from his own negligence.' 21 It is doubtful, how-
ever, that a driver, before being careless, reflects on the detri-
mental effect his inattentiveness or fault will have on the appli-
cability of the contributory negligence defense in any future
litigation.'12 It is just as reasonable to state that the contributory
negligence defense encourages a defendant to be negligent, since
he knows that despite his fault he may be absolved of all respon-
sibility if the plaintiff is even slightly at fault.2' Moreover, this
latter belief is more likely, since "an accident which occurs en-
tirely as the result of one man's negligence is about as rare as a
divorce that occurs entirely as the result of one spouse's
shortcomings."' 9
At first impression, it could be concluded that the switch
from the contributory negligence defense to a system of compar-
ative negligence, particularly the pure form, 3' would result in a
prohibitive increase in insurance rates. The experiences of the
states that have undergone this conversion, however, fail to sup-
port this conclusion. In Wisconsin,3 ' one of the pioneer states in
comparative negligence, and elsewhere,'3 2 the adoption of com-
parative negligence systems has not resulted in higher insurance
premiums. In fact, in 1969 it was reported that the cost for auto-
mobile insurance in all of the comparative negligence states was
below the national average.13' The belief that under a compara-
125. See C. HEFT, supra note 61, § 1.10.
126. See generally Burns, Comparative Negligence: A Law Professor Dissents, 51 ILL.
B.J. 708 (1963); Cotton, Comparative Negligence is NOT in the Public Interest, 17 LA.
B.J. 205 (Dec. 1969); Powell, supra note 109; Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of Con-
tributory Negligence, 3 Haav. L. REv. 263, 270 (1890).
127. Prosser, supra note 44, at 468.
128. C. HEFT, supra note 61, § 1.10.
129. Pfankuch, supra note 121, at 726.
130. See notes 157-59 and accompanying text infra.
131. Pfankuch, supra note 121, at 731.
132. For a brief comparison of insurance rates in selected states, see 1967 U. ILL.
L.F. 351.
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tive negligence system insurance rates must rise has not been
borne out for a number of reasons. One defense practitioner, in
observing that comparative negligence has not increased insur-
ance rates in his state, noted: "We pay more people perhaps, but
we pay less to each."' 34 Not only do the facts fail to support a
claim of rising rates,' 35 but a categorical statement that compar-
ative negligence will increase insurance rates simply cannot be
made because there are too many variables:
It is possible that comparative negligence has an effect
upon insurance rates, but that that effect cannot be detected
with the data on hand and the techniques used. Even if this is
true, however, some measure of its force has been obtained.
Adoption of a comparative negligence rule, as shown by the Ar-
kansas experience, would not have a catastrophic result upon
the insurance rate structure of any state. Indeed, it would not
have as much effect as rapid growth of population, increased
urbanization, or change to a traffic program with the effective
safety record of a neighboring state. Its effect, if any, would
probably go undetected in the rates and statistics of the insur-
ance industry.'36
Additionally, "keeping down insurance rates at the expense of
justice is not in keeping with humanitarian ideals of today."'3
Finally, the argument is often made by opponents of com-
parative negligence that it is impossible to compare fault with
fault and arrive at an accurate percentage value.'33 Such an esti-
mate, however, is not "any more foolish, or more difficult, than
the one which assigns $2,000 as fair value and compensation for
the pain of a broken leg, or the humiliation of a disfigured nose,
to say nothing of estimates based on a prognosis of speed of re-
covery, future earnings or permanent disability."'"' The work-
men's compensation system in South Carolina requires that an
injured employee's disability be expressed in terms of percent-
134. Pfankuch, supra note 121, at 731.
135. It is interesting to note "that insurance counsel who make this argument [that
insurance rates will increase] fail to produce statistics to support their claims, although
they are in the best position to obtain statistics as to whether the facts bear out their
claims." Maloney, supra note 63, at 163.
136. Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MICH. L.
R.v. 689, 728 (1960).
137. Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13N.A.C.C.A. L.J. 195, 199 (1954).
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ages.' Our legal system is already called upon frequently to as-
sign specific values to intangibles. Moreover, the percentages
under comparative negligence are undeniably more accurate
than the contributory negligence rule, which is "based on the ar-
bitrary conclusion that 100 per cent of the responsibility rests
with the plaintiff and none whatever with the defendant."''
Based upon the foregoing, this writer urges the abolition of
the contributory negligence defense in South Carolina. The de-
fense was designed to protect fledgling industries and works only
hardship when applied to automobile accidents, which is one
major source of litigation today. Since the reason for its birth
long ago has been relegated to the history books, stare decisis
no longer justifies its retention. The defense is plagued with excep-
tions and needless complications. Finally, none of the modern
rationalizations advanced in its support are sound.
IlH. SYSTEMS OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The four leading systems of comparative negligence are the
slight-gross theory, two modified theories, and pure comparative
negligence. The underlying philosophy of each of these sys-
tems-that a wrongdoer should be held responsible for the conse-
quences of his fault-is the same, yet each system varies accord-
ing to the amount of contributory negligence necessary to defeat
recovery. These four theories will be examined and compared
below.
A. Slight-Gr9ss Theory
Under the slight-gross theory, if defendant's negligence is
gross and plaintiff's negligence is slight in comparison, then the
plaintiff may recover, with his damages reduced in proportion to
the negligence attributable to him.' To illustrate, if plaintiff
was 5% negligent and defendant was 95% negligent, the plaintiff
may recover 95% of his damages. This comparative negligence
system has been implemented in only two states, both by
140. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-20 (1976).
141. Prosser, supra note 44, at 475.
142. See generally, C. HEFT, supra note 61, § 1.30; V. ScHWARTZ, supra note 38, at
66-73; Haugh, supra note 82, at 46; Prosser, supra note 44, at 484-89; Comment, Compar-
ative Negligence: A Look at the South Dakota Approach, 14 S.D.L. Rav. 92 (1969); Com-
ment, The Status of Comparative Negligence in South Dakota, 7 S.D.L. Rlv. 114 (1962).
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The jury decides whether the plaintiff's negligence is slight
in comparison to that of the defendant. First, both parties must
be found to be causally negligent. Then, a direct comparison of
the conduct of the two parties is made to determine slight or
gross negligence, without reference to the ordinary prudent man
standard.' In determining the degree of the plaintiff's negli-
gence the jury considers three factors: precautions plaintiff took
for his own safety, the degree of danger that the plaintiff should
have comprehended, and the foreseeability that an injury would
be a consequence of his conduct.' 5
The problem with'this version of comparative negligence is
that "the words 'slight' and 'gross' tend to raise perplexing se-
mantic difficulties. Since one of the primary aims of reform in
this area is to make the law more sensible to the jury, why force
the trial court to give instructions on such nebulous terms?""'4
Moreover, the abandonment of the reasonable man standard by
substituting a direct comparison of the parties' negligence results
in a de facto modified system.' 7 This has led one commentator
to conclude that under this version, comparative negligence is
applied only when necessary to avoid an unjust result, and when
this is not a danger the contributory negligence bar applies.' 8
Regardless, "there is no reason in public policy why the ordina-
rily-prudent-man standard should be varied."'49 This system is
not looked on with favor by the commentators and courts, as is
evidenced by the few states adopting it.'1°
143. The states are Nebraska and South Dakota. See notes 8 & 9 and accompanying
text supra.
144. C. HEFr, supra note 61, § 1.30; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 71-73.
145. Associated Eng'r, Inc. v. Job, 370 F.2d 633, 641 (8th Cir. 1966).
146. Haugh, supra note 82, at 46. The Nebraska court has refused to define the term
"slight," saying that "[a]ny one of common sense knows that slight negligence actually
means small or little negligence, and that gross negligence means just what it indicates,
gross or great negligence." Monasmith v. Cosden Oil Co., 124 Neb. 327, 331, 246 N.W. 623,
625 (1933). South Dakota courts have done little better, defining slight negligence as or-
dinary negligence that is "small in quantum." Friese v. Gulbrandson, 69 S.D. 179, 188-
89, 8 N.W.2d 438, 442 (1943).
147. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 73.
148. Glass, Comparative Negligence and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 FED. B.J.
52, 61 (1966).
149. C. HEFr, supra note 61, § 1.30.
150. See Haugh, supra note 82, at 46; Prosser, supra note 44, at 489.
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B. Modified Systems
Two rather similar modified systems of comparative negli-
gence have developed. One permits recovery by a plaintiff if his
negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought.' 5' The other system permits the
plaintiff to recover when his negligence was not greater than the
defendant's negligence.'52 This latter system is propounded by
the comparative negligence bill that was introduced in the South
Carolina General Assembly. 53 The difference between these two
modified systems can be explained best in terms of percentages.
Under the "not-as-great-as" version, a plaintiff may be responsi-
ble for up to 49% of the causal negligence and still recover.
Under the "not-greater-than" approach, a plaintiff may be re-
sponsible for up to 50% of the causal negligence and still recover.
The first system limits recovery to plaintiffs who are less than
50% negligent, while the second limits recovery to plaintiffs who
are 50% causally negligent or less. In both cases, of course, the
recovery is reduced by the amount of the plaintiff's fault.'
54
Between the two modified versions, the "not-greater-than"
version seems to be preferable. It allows recovery by a plaintiff
who is equally at fault, but still does not permit a plaintiff to
recover if he has been more culpable than the defendant. It al-
lows a limited recovery in a situation where the parties are
equally blameworthy, for a jury is likely to consider a plaintiff
who is 49% at fault "equally" negligent with the defendant who
is 51% at fault.'55 The recent trend in the states has been toward
this version of modified comparative negligence. 6
C. Pure Comparative Negligence
The pure comparative negligence system is the easiest to un-
derstand and the simplest to administer.'5 7 Under this version, a
plaintiff may recover even if his negligence is greater than that of
151. See generally V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 76.
152. See generaly id. at 77-78.
153. H.R. 2709, 1979 S.C. General Assembly.
154. See generally C. HEFr, supra note 61, § 8.131.
155. See, e.g., Moses v. Scott Paper Co., 280 F. Supp. 37 (D. Me. 1968); Vincent v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 136, 177 N.W.2d 513, 520 (1970) (Hallows, C.J., dis-
senting); C. HEFT, supra note 61, § 1.40; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 76.
156. See, e.g., V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 77.
157. See C. HEFT, supra note 61, § 1.50; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 46.
[Vol. 31
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [1980], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss4/8
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
the adverse party, plaintiff's recovery being diminished by the
degree of his contributory negligence. A plaintiff who is 99% at
fault can recover from a defendant who is 1% causally negligent.
In such a case, however, the plaintiff would recover only 1% of
his damages. In every case, however, before a defendant can be
held liable he must be guilty of some degree of causal negligence,
no matter how little. Ss Probably because of its significant varia-
tion from the common law, the adoption of the pure form of
comparative negligence is relatively rare, but it has been gaining
more support in the recent past.'50
D. Illustrations
The following examples illustrate the differences and simi-
larities in the results reached in a variety of given situations
under the four major versions of comparative negligence. Each
example concerns only two parties; the problem of multiple par-
ties is largely beyond the scope of this paper. 6 ' Under the con-
tributory negligence rule, the plaintiff in each example below
would recover nothing. Although only plaintiff's recovery is cal-
culated in each example, the same principles would apply to de-
fendants. In each example assume that the plaintiff suffered to-
tal damages of $1,000.
1. Plaintiff guilty of the lesser negligence. Assume that the
causal negligence of plaintiff is found to be 25%, while that of
defendant is found to be 75%. Under the slight-gross version,
plaintiff would not be permitted to recover anything, since his
negligence is not slight in comparison with that of defendant.
Under the not-as-great-as system, plaintiff would be entitled to
recover 75% of his damages, or $750. The same result would be
obtained under both the not-greater-than and the pure compara-
tive negligence versions.
2. Parties equally negligent. Assume that both plaintiff
and defendant are 50% causally negligent. Under the slight-gross
158. E.g., V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 46-52.
159. Pure comparative negligence was adopted in Rhode Island in 1956, Mississippi
in 1966, Florida and Washington in 1973, and Alaska, California, and New York in 1975.
See notes 7, 21, 29, 31, & 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
160. For a good discussion of comparative negligence and multiple parties see Pros-
ser, supra note 44, at 503-07. Multiple-party ituations will only be considered with re-
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theory, the action of plaintiff would obviously fail. Likewise,
under the not-as-great-as system, plaintiff would be barred from
any recovery, since under this system plaintiff can recover only if
his negligence was not as great as the defendant's negligence.
Under the not-greater-than version, however, plaintiff would be
entitled to recover $500 from defendant, the negligence of plain-
tiff not being greater than defendant's. This would also be the
result under the pure comparative negligence approach.
3. Plaintiff guilty of the greater negligence. Assume that
plaintiff is guilty of 75% of the causal negligence, while defen-
dant is responsible for only 25%. Under the slight-gross, not-as-
great-as, and not-greater-than versions of comparative negli-
gence, the plaintiff would recover nothing. Only under a pure
comparative negligence system would plaintiff recover anything.
In this instance, he would be entitled to $250.61
E. Conclusion
The search for the best possible version of comparative neg-
ligence may be never-ending. To choose the preferable system
from those presently available is an ambitious undertaking, not
because there is so much to choose from, but because the ques-
tions that necessarily must be posited have no easy answers.
Only two alternatives are worthy of serious consideration: the
not-greater-than modified version contained in the South Caro-
lina bill, and the pure comparative negligence version. The other
systems have not attracted much support.
1 2
The only difference between the not-greater-than modified
system and the pure system is that the modified system does not
allow, while the pure system permits, a plaintiff to recover when
his causal negligence has been greater than that of the defen-
dant. The decision on which system is preferable thus depends
on the answer to the following question: Is it permissible to allow
a party who is more at fault in an accident to recover from one
who is less at fault? This section will show that it is not only
permissible, but preferable.
The principal argument advanced in favor of the modified
system and against the pure comparative system is that it is
161. For further examples, including those concerning multiple defendants, see C.
HEFr, supra note 61, § 1.70.
162. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 342-43.
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morally improper to allow a plaintiff whose negligence is greater
than that of the defendant to recover. 6 3 The following is a typi-
cal hypothetical proposed by advocates of the modified system.
Suppose a 99% causally negligent plaintiff suffers $10,000 in
damages, while the 1% causally negligent defendant suffers only
a $100 loss. Under the modified system, the plaintiff would re-
cover nothing. Under the pure system, however, the plaintiff will
recover $100 from the defendant (1% of $10,000), and the defen-
dant will recover $99 from the plaintiff (99% of $100). The end
result is a $1 advantage for the plaintiff.6 ' On its face this hypo-
thetical appears difficult to justify. Nonetheless, no quick con-
clusions about a legal system should be drawn from one extreme
hypothetical. "[M]aking a judgment about an entire compara-
tive negligence system based on an unusual hypothetical case is
a classic example of a hard case making bad law."' 65 It should be
noted that this result occurs only when there is extreme disparity
between both the degree of culpable negligence of the parties
and the damages each suffered. This is a rare occurrence, illus-
trated by one commentator's search through the cases of Missis-
sippi, a pure comparative negligence jurisdiction. His research
did "not reveal any cases in which a 90% [or more] at fault
plaintiff obtained a substantial recovery from a defendant.'
168
Additionally, it is likely that when a jury is confronted with a
plaintiff who is so disproportionately at fault, it is simply going
to find that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole cause of the
accident and deny recovery. Proximate cause rules may similarly
bar the claim of the plaintiff when his conduct was a substantial
cause of the accident.
67
One of the motivating forces behind comparative negligence
legislation is the policy favoring a broader loss distribution. The
modified system defeats this policy. The pure system, on the
other hand, significantly pursues the goals of this policy. 6s Even
163. "There is a culpability factor associated with the question 'Who was more at
fault?' And the ordinary human reaction is to deny aid to the party found 'guilty.'"
Haugh, supra note 82, at 47.
164. For a similar example, see C. HFas, supra note 61, § 1.50.
165. V. ScHwARTz, supra note 38, at 345.
166. Id.
167. Cf. Menden v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 240 Wis. 87, 2 N.W.2d 856 (1942)
(application of proximate cause rule defeated'recovery even under a modified system).
168. GREGORY, LEGMLATVE Loss DISTRBUTION IN NEGGENCE ACTIONS c.XIV (1936).
See also Gross v. Denow, 61 Wis. 2d 40, 53, 212 N.W.2d 2, 10 (1973) (Hallows, C.J.,
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in the above hypothetical, the plaintiff pays his fair share. He
must bear 99% of his own loss and pay the defendant for 99% of
the defendant's loss. The defendant pays the plaintiff only for
the 1% of damage that the defendant caused. It would be unjust
to require the plaintiff to bear 100% of his own damages and also
be responsible for 99% of the defendant's loss-the result under
the modified system.'69 Under the pure system, each party pays
only for the damages attributable to his own causal negligence,
with no arbitrary cut-off point.
This presents another problem with the modified system. No
justification arises for the magical cut-off point of 50%.
There is nothing just in requiring a defendant to pay 51 percent
of the plaintiff's damages when the plaintiff is 49 percent at
fault and allowing the defendant to go scot-free when he is 49
percent at fault and the plaintiff is 51 percent at fault. What is
so magical about being less than, greater than, or equally negli-
gent, that justice must depend on it?"'
Juries find it difficult to draw such fine distinctions. Because of
the extreme difference in the outcome that one percent can have,
the modified comparative negligence system has been character-
ized as "inconsistent, illogical and unjust." ''
The pure system also operates to eliminate a potential
source of injustice for defendants. Under the modified system,
a sympathetic jury may succumb to the temptation to lower its
finding on the degree of his negligence so as to come under the
51% bar. The result is an increase in defendant's negligence
and a corresponding increase in defendant's liability. Under the
pure system, the jury would have no incentive to reduce a
plaintiff's degree of negligence from what they objectively find
it to be.'
The equity of the pure comparative negligence system is
most apparent in multiple-party situations in which the modi-
fied version works untenable injustice. One common example
should make this clear. Assume that plaintiff is 40% negligent,
dissenting).
169. See V. SCHWAR'Z, supra note 38, at 345.
170. Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 136, 177 N.W.2d 513, 520 (1970)
(Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
171. R. RICHARDSON, DIsSTrr TO REPORT OF ABA SPECIAL COMMIrrrE ON AUrOMOBLE
ACCIDENT REPARATIONS 6, 14.
172. See Legislation, supra note 120, at 334.
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defendant A is 10% negligent, and defendant B is 50% negligent.
As between plaintiff and defendant A there would be no recovery
under the modified system, for plaintiff is guilty of the greater
negligence. As between plaintiff and defendant B (50%), how-
ever, there would be recovery under the modified system. If
plaintiff's damages are found by the jury to be $1,000, then de-
fendant B is responsible for $600 (60% of $1,000). The plaintiff's
negligence is assessed against each defendant individually rather
than as a unit for purposes of liability, but the defendant against
whom recovery is permitted is responsible for the damages at-
tributable to all defendants. 73 This result is manifestly unjust.
Under the pure comparative negligence system, defendant A
would not get a free ride on defendant B's bankroll, but each
party would be responsible for his own conduct. Plaintiff would
have to bear $400 of his own loss, defendant A would contribute
$100, and defendant B would be liable for $500.17
Finally, from an administrative point of view, the pure com-
parative negligence system is vastly superior. It is "a model of
brevity and simplicity"'7 5 and has "the salutary effect of simpli-
fying jury instructions, eliminating jury confusion, and reducing
the number of appeals.' '17 The modified system, on the other
hand, is the result of "obvious compromises between contesting
groups in the legislature. . . . They are, in other words, political
in character; and like most political compromises, they are re-
markable neither for soundness in principle nor success in
operation." 7 '
In conclusion, the contributory negligence bar works inequi-
tably in modern society and justice demands that it be replaced
by a system of comparative negligence. The slight-gross system
of comparative negligence has never received much support. The
recovery cut-off limits of 50 or 51% characteristic of the modified
systems, are difficult to justify and apply. The pure system, how-
ever, apportions accidental loss equitably to each party accord-
ing to his or her relative fault. For all these reasons, the pure
173. See Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 131, 177 N.W.2d 513, 518
(1970) (Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
174. It should be noted that the South Carolina bill properly calls for joint and sev-
eral liability between joint tortfeasors. H.R. 2709, § 1(C), 1979 S.C. General Assembly.
175. C. HEFr, supra note 61, § 1.50.
176. Legislation, supra note 120, at 335.
177. Prosser, supra note 44, at 484.
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system of comparative negligence should be given serious consid-
eration in South Carolina by both the legislature and the
courts,' who should be careful not to stop halfway on the road
to achieving a fully just, equitable, and expedient accident repa-
rations system.
H. Fred Kuhn, Jr.
178. The question may arise concerning which forum, the legislature or the judici-
ary, is the proper one to initiate this change in the law. In most states, the contributory
negligence bar has been substituted with a system of comparative negligence through
legislative action. See notes 6-30 & 32-34 and accompanying text supra. The judiciary,
however, has been responsible for the adoption of comparative negligence in three states:
Alaska, California, and Florida. In each of these states, the pure form of comparative
negligence was instituted. See notes 31 & 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
In support of judicial action, it is often noted that a rule of law "that is judicial in
origin can be, and appropriately should be, altered by the institution which was its crea-
tor." Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975). The South Carolina Supreme
Court could not be characterized as reluctant to overrule when confronted with other tort
doctrines of judicial origin that have become outmoded. E.g., Gasque v. Eagle Machine
Co., 270 S.C. 499, 243 S.E.2d 831 (1978) (privity-of-contract requirement abrogated);
Brown v. Anderson County Hosp. Ass'n, 268 S.C. 479, 234 S.E.2d 873 (1977) (charitable
immunity modified). Our court has acted even when the rule of law was of legislative
origin, as witnessed by the recent demise of the South Carolina guest passenger statute.
Ramey v. Ramey, - S.C. ... , 258 S.E.2d 883 (1979). Additionally, the courts' constant
exposure to tort problems provides them with as comprehensive an insight into tort re-
form as the committee system provides the legislature. See Keeton, Creative Continuity
in the Law of Tort, 75 HARv. L. REv. 463 (1962). Clearly, the South Carolina Supreme
Court has the power, precedent, and expertise necessary to institute comparative negli-
gence in this state.
The argument asserted against judicial action in this area is that if the contributory
negligence bar is onerous the legislature would have changed it long ago, and since the
legislature has not acted, neither should the courts. E.g., Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585,
627, 256 N.W.2d 400, 420 (1977). This theory of legislative assent by silence is beguiling.
[Sluch a doctrine suggests the interesting proposition that it is the legislatures
which have now become the ultimate courts of last resort in our various States;
that if they delay long enough to correct our errors those errors thus become
both respectable and immutably frozen; and, finally, the larger and more dis-
mal corollary that if enough people persist long enough in ignoring an injustice
it thereby becomes just. We reject as both un-Christian and legally unsound
the hopeless doctrine that this Court is shackled and helpless to redeem itself
from its original sin, however or by whomever long condoned.
Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch Co., 350 Mich. 135, 146, 85 N.W.2d 97, 102 (1957). While the
courts should not lightly overturn an established rule of law, neither should they be
bound by legislative inaction. See generally Fleming, Foreward: Comparative Negligence
at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CAL. L. REv. 239, 279-80 (1976).
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H. 2709: PRESENTLY BEFORE
SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina:
SECTION 1. Section 15-1-300 of the 1976 Code is amended to read: "Section
15-1-300.
A) As used in this section:
1) 'Claimant' means an injured party or his legal representative.
2) 'Fault' means negligence, contributory negligence, the negli-
gence of a fellow servant or assumption of risk.
3) 'Negligence', as is contemplated for the purpose of this section
only, means not only the lack of ordinary care, but also willful,
wanton, or reckless acts or omissions.
B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all actions brought
upon theories of negligence or strict tort liability, common law or
statutory, for damages due to death or injury to person or property,
the fact that the claimant was also at fault in causing the injury
complained of shall not bar recovery of damages unless such fault
was greater than the fault of the defending tortfeasor, * but any dam-
ages recoverable shall be reduced for purposes of judgment by an
amount which bears the same ratio to the total damages recoverable
as the claimants fault bears to the defending tortfeasors fault.
C) In any action brought against joint tortfeasors, each joint tortfeasor
against whom a judgment is obtained shall be jointly and severally
liable for the full amount of the claimant's judgmdnt against any
other joint tortfeasor liable for the injury complained of.
D) In actions covered by this act in which counterclaims, cross actions
or third party complaints are asserted, successful claimants shall
have judgment for the full amount of their recoverable damages, as
reduced on account of their fault, and there shall be no right of
setoff between parties to the action.
E) In actions covered by this section, the court shall submit to the
finder of fact written interrogatories requiring assessment of the total
damages recoverable by a claimant, if any, and the percentage of
fault separately attributable to the claimant and any joint
tortfeasors, and the court shall enter judgment after making compu-
tations required by this section."
SECTION 2. Section 5-7-70 of the 1976 Code is amended by striking in the first
sentence of the first paragraph, "if such person has not in any way brought
about any such injury or damage by his own negligent act or negligently con-
tributed thereto". As amended the first paragraph shall read:
"Any person who shall receive bodily injury or damages in his person or
* (Emphasis added). This existing language renders the Bill a modified form of com-
parative negligence. See notes 151-56 and accompanying text supra. Without the itali-
cized language, the Bill would propose the pure form of comparative negligence. See
notes 157-59 and accompanying text supra.
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property through a defect in any street, causeway, bridge or public way or by
reason of a defect or mismanagement of anything under control of the corpora-
tion within the limits of any city or town may recover in an action against such
city or town the amount of actual damages sustained by him by reason thereof.
But no person bringing an action under this section shall recover damages to
exceed fifteen thousand dollars for bodily injury or death or to exceed five thou-
sand dollars for damages to his property."
SECTION 3. Section 42-1-520 of the 1976 Code is amended by striking "com-
mon law and the employer may avail himself of the defenses of contributory
negligence, negligence of a fellow servant and assumption of risk, as such de-
fenses exist at common law", and inserting "law". As amended the section
shall read: "Section 42-1-520. An employee who elects not to operate under this
Title, shall, in any action to recover damages for personal injury or death
brought against an employer accepting the compensation provisions of this Ti-
tle, proceed at law."
SECTION 4. Section 58-17-3730 of the 1976 Code is amended to read: "Section
58-17-3730. No such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to
have been guilty of contributory negligence when the violation by such common
carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the
injury or death of such employee."
SECTION 5. Section 15-73-20 and Section 57-5-1840 of the 1976 Code are
repealed.
SECTION 6. This act shall take effect upon approval by the Governor.
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